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Federal Indian Law: Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Why
Oklahoma Businesses Should Revamp Legal Relation-
ships with Indian Tribes After Kiowa Tribe v. Manufac-
turing Technologies, Inc.
I. Introduction
In May 1998, the United States Supreme Court decided Kiowa Tribe v.
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.' For Oklahoma, the Supreme Court decision
represented a significant shift in Oklahoma's jurisprudence regarding tribal sovereign
immunity. In essence, the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes are immune from
suit in state and federal court on contracts performed on or off reservations.' The
immunity doctrine extends to both commercial and governmental activities of the
tribal government.' The United States Supreme Court's decision in Manufacturing
Technologies stood in opposition to the Oklahoma Supreme Court's holding in
Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe (Hoover 11),4 decided just weeks before Manufacturing
Technologies. The Oklahoma decision in Hoover 1I reaffirmed Oklahoma's position
on tribal sovereign immunity.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that tribes are not immune from suit when
(1) acting commercially with non-tribal members outside Indian country, or (2)
engaging in activities with non-tribal members that do not interfere directly with the
tribe's retained powers over domestic relations activities, tribal criminal matters, or
tribal membership.6 This disparity between the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court proves to be dramatic for the types of legal
relationships created between tribes and non-tribal entities.
1. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
2. See id. at 760.
3. See id.
4. 957 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1998).
5. Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe, 909 P.2d 59 (Okla. 1995) (Hoover 1), reversed the Oklahoma County
District Court's grant of summary judgment for the Kiowa Tribe and remanded the case back to
Oklahoma County District Court for further proceedings. The district court granted Hoover's motion for
summary judgment, and the Kiowa Tribe appealed. That appeal was decided by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe, 957 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1998) (Hoover 11). Coincidentally, because Hoover
11 was decided immediately before the Manufacturing Technologies decision, the Hoover II decision was
not directly reversed, questioned, or discussed and in fact was vacated and remanded back to the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma by the United States Supreme Court in late Oct. 1998, in light of
Manufacturing Technologies. See Kiowa Tribe v. Hoover, 119 S.Ct. 32, 32 (1998). The Oklahoma
Supreme Court subsequently remanded the case to the trial court with the direction to order judgment
in favor of the tribe. See Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe, No. 87,139, 1999 Okla. LEXIS 76, at *1 (Okla. June
29, 1999). The Hoover case arose, as did the Manufacturing Technologies case, out of a single bundle
of transactions entered into by the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma. See supra note 60.
6. See Hoover II, 957 P.2d at 95.
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Part II of this Note touches on the background of tribal sovereign immunity. Part
III reviews the Manufacturing Technologies decision. Part IV analyzes seven issues:
(1) the strength of precedent relied upon in Manufacturing Technologies; (2) the
concept of inherent sovereignty in relation to tribal sovereign immunity; (3) the
expansion of sovereign immunity to off-reservation commercial activity; (4) the
doctrine of preemption as a sword to attack a sovereign immunity defense; (5) the
differences between state/federal immunity and tribal immunity; (6) the justifications
for the new broad doctrine of tribal immunity; and (7) the injustices created by the
judicial expansion of tribal immunity. Part V recommends to Oklahoma prac-
titioners and businesses an approach to forming legal relationships with Indian tribes
in a climate where, after Manufacturing Technologies' cynical treatment of tribal
immunity, the doctrine teeters on the brink of nonexistence.7
I. Brief History of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Tribal sovereign immunity has been described as a remnant of the inherent tribal
sovereignty that Indian tribes possessed prior to the European discovery of North
America.8 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the inherent
sovereignty of Indian tribes.9 The doctrine of sovereign immunity, meaning the
"king could do no wrong," has its roots in feudal England.'" The doctrine allows
a government to protect itself from suit for harm caused by governmental
activities." Generally, the state and federal governments have since waived
sovereign immunity for numerous causes of action. 2
The first judiciad recognition of sovereign immunity in Indian law occurred in
1919 in Turner v. United States.3 Although courts have questioned the circumstan-
ces under which this doctrine was recognized, 4 the United States Supreme Court
7. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
8. See Scott Danahy, License to Discriminate: The Application of Sovereign hnmunity to
Employment Discrimination Claims Brought by Non-Native American Employees of Tribally Owned
Businesses, 25 FLA. SI. U. L. REv. 679, 683-84 (1998).
9. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-59 (1832) (holding that Indian tribes are
considered distinct, independent political communities retaining their original natural rights from time
immemorial). See also generally United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376 (1896); Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
10. Ann Donnelly, Immunity Hurts Tribes and Rest of Us, COLUMBIAN, Jan. 18, 1998, at B13,
available in 1998 WL 7178736.
11. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1999) (waiving state sovereign immunity for limited
contract and tort actions against state); COLO REV. STAT. § 4-160 (1998) (waiving state sovereign
immunity upon authorization of state Claims Commissioner for suits where, were the state a private
person, they would be liable); Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, 51 OKLA. STAT. § 153 (Supp.
1998) (waiving state sovereign immunity for losses resulting from torts of the state, or torts of state
employees acting within the scope of employment); see also WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW IN A NUT SHELL 88 (1998). William Canby is a judge for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
13. 248 U.S. 354 (1919). In Turner, the plaintiff filed suit against the Creek Nation for "actions of
the mob which resulted in the destruction" of a fence. Id. at 357. The Court noted that neither the tribe,
nor the officials (except for the treasurer) had anything to do with the destruction of the personal
property. Id. at 356.




implied that a defense of sovereign immunity could be used in a tort action against
the Creek Nation.s The doctrine was revisited in 1940 in United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.'6 The USF&G Court, relying on Turner, held that,
as a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where authorized
by Congress. 7 These general holdings in Turner and USF&G have since been
extended by circuit courts to allow tribes to expressly waive immunity to suit."
The doctrine of sovereign immunity for tribes has been rediscussed many times by
the United States Supreme Court in the last twenty years. 9
In 1977, in Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game,' the Court held that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred an action by Washington in state court
against the Puyallup Tribe to regulate fishing activities.2' Similarly, the Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martine? Court in 1978 held that a suit asserting a violation of
the Indian Civil Rights Act against Santa Clara Pueblo was barred by the tribe's
sovereign immunity." In 1986, in Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Engineering,24 the United States Supreme Court held that the
tribe's sovereign immunity was not subject to general diminution by the State, when
North Dakota required that the tribe consent to suit in any civil action before being
allowed access to state court' The 1991 Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatakl6
for supporting the principle of tribal sovereign immunity." Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998).
15. See Turner, 248 U.S. at 358.
16. 309 U.S. 506 (1940). In USF&G, the United States sought to set aside a state court ruling
issuing a credit against the Indian tribes in favor of surety of obligations between the United States, on
behalf of the Indian tribes, and a company leasing certain lands from the tribes. Id. at 510-11. The court
noted that a sovereign should not be subject to cross-claims away from its own forum just because a
debtor is unavailable within its own jurisdiction.
17. See id at 512.
18. Although Turner spoke only of congressional consent to validate a waiver of tribal sovereign
immunity, several circuits have since held that a tribe can expressly waive immunity. See Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Val-U Coast. Co., 50 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1995); Big Spring v. United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 767 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980);
Federico v. Capital Gaming Int'l, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 354 (D.R.I. 1995). To a larger extent, courts have
debated the standard for an express waiver of immunity. See, e.g., Florida v. Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d
1237, 1243-44 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a tribe does not waive sovereign immunity by engaging
in gaming activity regulated under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act); American Indian Agric. Credit
Consortium, Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374, 1380 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that a
provision in a promissory note providing for recovery of attorneys fees and choice of law does not
constitute waiver of immunity); Buchanan v. Sokaogon Chippewa Tribe, 40 F. Supp.2d 1043, 1047 (E.D.
Wis. 1999) (holding that a tribal ordinance containing a clause granting the tribe the authority to waive
sovereign immunity was not an express waiver of immunity by the tribe); GNS, Inc. v. Winnebago Tribe,
866 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (finding that an arbitration clause does not necessarily waive
tribal sovereign immunity).
19. See infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
20. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
21. See i. at 172-73.
22. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
23. See id. at 59.
24. 476 U.S. 877.
25. See id. at 890. The Court further held, however, that by accessing state courts, the Tribe's
1999]
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Court reaffirmed the judicial doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity in a discussion
of state sovereignty.Y The Court distinguished states from tribes in a discussion
of mutuality of concession.' The Blatchford Court noted that although states can
sue each other, tribes are different, and no mutuality exists as to actions arising
between a tribe and a state." In 1991, the Court held in Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe0 that an action by Oklahoma to
collect taxes on cigarettes sold on land held in trust by the United States was barred
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity' Most recently in 1997, the Court in Idaho
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe recognized tribal immunity from suit by a state as a
derivative of a state's immunity from suit by a tribe." Each decision provides
support for judicial recognition of a tribe's sovereign immunity from suit absent
express abrogation by Congress.
It is important to note that sovereign immunity for tribes generally has never been
legislated by Congress.' The lack of legislative sources of tribal sovereign
immunity is troubling. A judicially created doctrine is constantly under scrutiny
from later courts, and lacks the affirmative strength that a law passed by the
legislature can furnish. However, implied ratification by Congress has provided
added strength to the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. In several instances,
Congress has enacted legislation that limited tribal immunity from suit, or shielded
Indian tribes from the effect of federal statutes by disclaiming any statutory effect
on tribal sovereign immunity 5
Prior to Manufacturing Technologiesi the Supreme Court had not addressed, as
it relates to tribal sovereign immunity, the significance of where tribal activities
occur, or the significance of whether those tribal activities are more commercial or
governmental in nature. However, several lower courts discussed these concepts.
The concept of immunity extending to off-reservation activities was noted by the
immunity would not be a defense for activities required for a fair trial, such as compelling discovery.
See id. at 891.
26. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
27. See id.
28. See id. The theory of mutuality of concession recognizes that states agreed at the signing of the
Constitution that if Stat' A agreed to be sued by State B, then State B could also sue State A. See 1d. at
782.
29. See id at 775.
30. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
31. See id. at510.
32. 523 U.S. 261 (1997).
33. See id. at 268.
34. Compare infra note 35.
35. See 16 U.S.C. § 3378 (1994) (disclaiming effect of environmental statute on any rights of
immunity recognized by Indian tribe); 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c)(3) (1994); 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)
(1994); 25 U.S.C. § 450n (1994) (mandatory liability insurance); 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1994) (prohibition
of new regulations diminishing immunities still retained by other tribes); 25 U.S.C. § 490 (1994)
(authorization to waive immunity for loans); 25 U.S.C. § 3746 (1994) (management of agricultural
lands); 25 U.S.C. § 1733 (1994) (waiving immunity in oil and gas royalty management); 30 U.S.C. §
1733 (noting that a trite must waive its defense of sovereign immunity for wrongful disclosure of




Ninth Circuit in In re Greene.' Greene involved repossession of furniture by a
tribally owned furniture store. In a bankruptcy action to recover the furniture from
the tribe, the tribe asserted the defense of tribal immunity. The Greene Court held
that even though the repossession took place off of reservation land, Congress'
apparent inaction, in light of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 7 showed that
Congress intended to allow tribes to retain sovereign immunity, including its
extraterritorial component Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held in Sac and Fox
Nation v. Hanson39 that a tribe does not waive its sovereign immunity either by
engaging in commercial activities or acting outside of the reservation.'
However, all jurists are not willing to concede that tribal sovereign immunity
extends off the reservation. In his concurring opinion in Potawatomi, for example,
Justice Stevens questioned whether tribal sovereign immunity extends to commercial
activity outside of the tribe's territory.4'
Moreover, some states have held that sovereign immunity is an invalid defense
for business conduct that takes place off reservation.4 The New Mexico Supreme
Court in Pueblo of Acoma v. Padilla relied primarily on Nevada v. Hall," where
the United States Supreme Court held there is no federal law prohibiting a state's
exercise of jurisdiction over sovereign sister states." The Padilla Court reasoned
that if there is no law prohibiting such exercise, then jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign is solely a matter of comity.4 Since New Mexico opened itself up to suit
for claims similar to those in Padilla, then so too could New Mexico assert
jurisdiction over those claims when a foreign sovereign acted within New
Mexico." This jurisprudence proved to be a critical element in Oklahoma's
justification for limiting tribal sovereign immunity for off-reservation activities.
Prior to Hoover II, Oklahoma maintained that suits against tribes were proper for
activities taking place off the reservation and that sovereign immunity was not a
defense.4 In Hoover 1, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, relying solely on Padilla
and Hall, determined that tribal immunity was limited in nature and that only those
activities withdrawn by Congress are outside of state jurisdiction." Several cases
prior to and since Hoover I have addressed and limited tribal sovereign immunity
36. 980 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1992).
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605, 1607 (1994) (eliminating sovereign immunity of foreign states in
commercial transactions).
38. See Greene, 980 F.2d at 594 (1992).
39. 47 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 1995).
40. See id. at 1065. In Hanson, the tribe sought to be enjoined as a third party in state court by the
board that the tribe created to oversee large manufacturing plants.
41. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizens Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,515 (1991) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
42. See Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 754 P.2d 845, 850 (N.M. 1988).
43. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
44. See id. at 424.
45. See Padilla, 754 P.2d at 850.
46. See id.
47. See Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe, 909 P.2d 59, 62 (Okla. 1995).
48. See id.
1999]
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in Oklahoma.49 In Hoover I1, the Oklahoma Supreme Court resurrected an
argument used by the Oklahoma courts in State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga
TDibe."° The Hoover 11 court distinguished Oklahoma from other states because of
its unique territorial status with Indian tribes."' Hoover 11 relied primarily on
Montana v. United States,' a case which primarily dealt with tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians within a tribal reservation." The Hoover 11 court held that tribal
immunity dissipates when the tribe enters into consensual economic activity with
non-tribal membem, or when it engages in activity that does not directly affect
specific retained tribal powers.'M This judicial history of tribal sovereign immunity
provided the backdrop against which Manufacturing Technologies was decided.
Ilf. Discussion of Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.
The Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma is a federally recognized Indian tribe, consisting
of approximately 1 a ,000 members.5 The tribal government is located in Carnegie,
Oklahoma. Although, as a result of the Jerome Agreement of 1892, the Kiowa
Tribe does not have a reservation, the Kiowa lands consist of some 1200 acres held
in fee and additional land held in trust by the United States.' The day-to-day
operations are performed by an eight member Business Committee that holds
executive powers under the Kiowa Constitution.
49. See Aircraft Equip. Co. v. Kiowa Tribe, 939 P.2d 1143, 1148 (Okla. 1997) (holding that
contracts performed off-ieservation are not shielded by tribal sovereign immunity); First Nat'l Bank v.
Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Intertribal Land Use Comm., 913 P.2d 299, 301 (Okla. 1996) (holding
that sovereign immunity -lid not bar suit for loans made off-reservation in tribal dressmaking operation);
State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.2d 77, 90 (Okla. 1985) (holding that tribes are not
barred from being enjoined from conducting bingo games by doctrine of sovereign immunity).
50. Hoover II, 957 P.2d 81, 95-96 (Okla. 1998).
51. See id. The 1833 Indian Removal Act moved many tribes east of the Mississippi to what was
regarded as Indian country in the present Oklahoma. Those tribes were permitted to exercise exclusive
rights of tribal self-government until Oklahoma Territory was created, subjecting the tribes to the federal
and territorial governmen t. The Oklahoma Organic Act of 1890 divided Indian and Oklahoma Territories
and permitted all Indians to participate in the territorial government as citizens of the United States, while
still retaining their right to tribal government. In 1906, Congress admitted Oklahoma Territory and Indian
Territory as a single state. Oklahoma tribes were excluded from the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
an Act signifying the end of the assimilationist era in Indian policy. Oklahoma tribes were said to have
advanced to a point of asimilation into the state that to allow them to organize politically would reverse
the assimilationary proce.s. See FEix COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 427-34 (Univ. of
N.M. Press 1971) (1942)
52. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
53. See UL at 544.
54. See supra text aimcompanying note 5.
55. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998)
(No. 96-1037).
56. See id. at 4.
57. See id. at 5. The Kiowa Tribe relies primarily on the Anadarko Area Court of Indian Offenses




In April 1990, the Kiowa Tribe purchased 100% of the stock of Clinton-Sherman
Aviation, Inc.s This Oklahoma corporation served as an aircraft repair center near
Bums Flat, Oklahoma." In exchange for the stock in Clinton-Sherman Aviation,
Inc., the Tribe executed promissory notes to the shareholders of the corporation.6
The Kiowa tribe gave Manufacturing Technologies a promissory note for $285,000
in exchange for Manufacturing Technologies' Clinton-Sherman stock." The note
was due ninety days after the date on the note and was payable in two
installments.0 ' Although reportedly signed on Indian land in Carnegie, Oklahoma,
the note was delivered and exchanged in Oklahoma City.0 The note clearly stated
that "nothing in this note subjects or limits the sovereign rights of the Kiowa Tribe
of Oklahoma."'
The Kiowa Tribe never made payment on any of the promissory notes issued to
the sellers of stock during the ninety day period.' All holders of the promissory
notes, except for Manufacturing Technologies, foreclosed upon the shares in
Clinton-Aviation that they held as collateral and sold the shares at public auction
for $1 each.' Manufacturing Technologies filed suit in Oklahoma County District
Court on the promissory note.' In its answer, the Kiowa Tribe raised the defense
of immunity.' However, the trial court ignored the defense and issued judgment
in favor of Manufacturing Technologies. On appeal, the Oklahoma Civil Court of
Appeals, relying on Hoover I, affirmed the district court's decision. After the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's denial of the Kiowa Tribe's petition for certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy,'
specifically held that tribes "enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those
contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they were
made on or off a reservation."7 The Court reached this conclusion after a detailed
review of previous judicial decisions concerning tribal immunity, dating back to
Turner." The Manufacturing Technologies Court recognized tribal sovereign
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id Those shareholders represent parties in a volume of legislation that followed the
subsequent breach of contract by the Kiowa Tribe. See Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe, 909 P.2d 59 (Okla.
1995); Aircraft Equip. Co. v. Kiowa Tribe, 921 P.2d 359 (Okla. 1996); JBJ Invs., Inc. v. Kiowa Tribe,
975 P.2d 442 (Okla. 1998); Carl E. Gungoll Exploration Joint Venture v. Kiowa Tribe, 975 P.2d 442
(Okla. 1998).






67. See id. at 8.
68. See id.
69. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer.
70. Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998).
71. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
1999)
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immunity as a judicial doctrine, one that lacked the support of positive law by the
United States Congress.' Recognizing tribal sovereign immunity developed almost
by accident, the Ccurt noted that Turner is "but a slender reed" in support of tribal
sovereign immunity.' Based on this original source of the doctrine and continued
United States Supreme Court reliance on Turner, the Manufacturing Technologies
Court continued it.,; support - although skeptically - of sovereign immunity.74
The Court noted that Congress had many opportunities to limit or eliminate iribal
sovereign immunity as a source of power for the tribes under the plenary power
doctrine.' Congress chose not to address tribal sovereign immunity, and in some
cases, legislated specific acts to not affect the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 6
This legislative deference to not disturb the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity,
the Court reasoned, is founded on a congressional intent to "promote economic
development and tribal self-sufficiency."'
.The Court, while recognizing for long-standing judicial doctrine, expressed
reluctance to offer continued support for the doctrine.78 The majority maintained
that tribal immunity has outgrown what was needed to "safeguard tribal self-gover-
nance." '" Particularly, the Court identified the growing rate of economic develop-
ment by Indian tribes across the country.' Justice Kennedy wrote that tribes now
engage in a variety of enterprises including casinos, resorts, tobacco sales, and
manufacturing."' The majority opinion went as far as suggesting that the presence
of these now substanitial economic endeavors by Indian tribes favors abrogation, or,
at least, limitation of the broad doctrine of tribal immunity.' Justice Kennedy
noted (and the dissent reiterated) that tribal immunity is a doctrine that is potentially
harmful to those unaware of the status of those with whom they are dealing or
unaware of the doctrine of tribal immunity.' The majority concluded by stating
that individuals - especially tort victims - have no choice in the application of
tribal immunity.u
Justice Stevens, in a vigorous dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg and Thomas,
attacked the source of tribal immunity as weak and misplaced.' The dissent
continued by opining that the doctrine was unjust in its commercial application.'
72. See Manufacluring Techs., 523 U.S. at 756-57.
73. See id. at 757.
74. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
75. See id. at 759.
76. See id. at 759-59.
77. Id. at 757 (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizens Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,510
(1991)).





83. See id. at 758, 766.
84. See id. at 758.
85. See id. at 762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




Justice Stevens declared that many of the previous acts of Congress and decisions
of the Supreme Court had narrowed the doctrine of tribal immunity as applied to
Manufacturing Technologies."
IV. Manufacturing Technologies, An Analysis
A. Turner and Judicial Deference
Manufacturing Technologies stands in part for judicial legislation, and in part,
paradoxically, for judicial deference. The Manufacturing Technologies Court
recognized that the Supreme Court itself created this powerful tribal doctrine.'
Justice Stevens noted repeatedly in his dissent that tribal sovereign immunity was
an illegitimate doctrine, borne of unreasoned precedent. He noted that there is no
federal statute or treaty that extends immunity to Indian tribes' commercial activities
off the reservation.' Justice Stevens urged that the Supreme Court should not
"extend the judge-made doctrine" of sovereign immunity in order to preempt state
authority to provide immunity as a matter of comity.9 He noted, as did the
majority, that Turner is a weak case for tribal immunity and at most should "extend
only to federal cases in which the United States is litigating in behalf of the
Tribe."9'
Only recently have Indian tribes delved into the masses of litigation without the
support of the United States on the litigation team. Although Indian tribes, pursuant
to federal statute, can choose to request that the United States represent their tribal
interests,9 Indian tribes have gained much of the economic and legal resources
necessary to represent tribal interests alone. This codified right suggests that the
holding in Turner indeed was narrow, representing a time in which a party would
be barred from bringing suit against the United States under traditional principles
of sovereign immunity, even though the United States was acting in the interest of
the tribe.
However, the United States Supreme Court in Manufacturing Technologies
correctly noted that the precedent for tribal immunity not only had been established
in Turner, but had been followed and relied upon by courts nationwide for over fifty
years.93 The Court recognized that Congress has been well aware of this doctrine,
has been free to enact legislation to the contrary, and has done nothing to abrogate
the general doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court.' It has long been held that the
Supreme Court should grant deference to Congress in activities that are political in
nature.
87. See id. at 765.
88. See id. at 761.
89. See id at 760.
90. Id
91. Id at 762.
92. See 25 U.S.C. § 175 (1994).
93. See Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998).
94. See id. at 758-59.
1999]
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In Manufacturing Technologies, the majority yielded to Congress to legislate that
which Congress had done periodically with tribal immunity." Congress has
addressed tribal sovereign immunity in various forms has proposed legislation that
would allow those with civil disputes with Indian tribes to sue in federal court."
95. See supra note 37.
96. See Donnelly, supra note 10. Sen. Slade Gorton (R.-Wash.) introduced the following legislation
before the 105th Congress. Although the bill died at the end of the 105th term, it gives an interesting
example of not only Congressional recognition of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, but the
extent by which some legislators seek to extinguish the protective doctrine. Senate Bill 1691, presented
on February 27, 1998, mead as follows:
Section 1 (b) Congress finds that -
(1) a universad principle of simple justice and accountable government requires that all
persons be afforded legal remedies for violations of their legal rights;
(2) the fifth amendment of the Constitution builds upon that principle by guaranteeing
that "... . no per;on shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law";
(3) sovereign immunity, a legal doctrine that has its origins in feudal England when
it was policy that the "King could do no wrong," affronts that principle and is incom-
patible with the rule of law in democratic society;
(4) for more than a century, the Government of the United States and the States have
dramatically scaled back the doctrine of sovereign immunity without impairing their
dignity, sovereignty, or ability to conduct valid government policies;
(5) the only remaining governments in the United States that maintain and assert the
full scope of imunity from lawsuits are Indian tribal governments;
(6) according to the 1990 decennial census conducted by the Bureau of the Census,
nearly half of th-. individuals residing on Indian reservations are non-Indian;
(7) for the non-Indian individuals referred to in paragraph (6) and the thousands of
people of the United States, Indian and non-Indian, who interact with tribal governments
everyday, the rights to due process and legal remedy are constantly at risk because of
tribal immunity;
(8) by providing a complete shield from legal claims, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity frustrates justice and provokes social tensions and turmoil inimical to social
peace;
(9) the Supreme Court has affirmed that Congress has clear and undoubted
constitutional authority to define, limit, or waive the immunity of Indian tribes; and
(10) it is necessary to address the issue referred to in paragraph (9) in order to -
(A) secure the rights provided under the Constitution for all persons; and
(B) uphold th . principle that no government should be above the law.
(C) PURPOSE- The purpose of this Act is to assist in ensuring due process and legal
rights throughout the United States and to strengthen the rule of law making Indian tribal
governments subject to judicial review with respect to certain civil matters....
... Sec. 6. INDIAN TRIBES AS DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS.
(a) CONSENT TO SUIT IN STATE COURT- Consent is hereby given to institute a
civil cause of action against an Indian tribe in a court of general jurisdiction of the State,
on a claim arising within the State, including a claim arising on an Indian reservation or
Indian country, in any case in which the cause of action -
(1) arises under Federal law or the law of a State; and
(2) relates to -
(A) tort claims; or
(B) claims for cases not sounding in tort that involve any contract made by the




Currently, legislation on tribal sovereign immunity, although not yet passed, is being
considered by the 106th Congress.'
It is unlikely that Congress will alter tribal sovereign immunity drastically. Many
Americans believe that there is still a great debt to be repaid to the tribes for
injustices of the past. It will take repeated injustices affecting constituents'
pocketbooks to influence Congress enough to eliminate tribal sovereign immunity.
It is more likely that Justice Stevens will gain support among the other Justices if
tribal governments continue to misuse the doctrine of tribal immunity. Ultimately,
the Court probably would have no problem defeating a doctrine that lacked
legislative endorsement and was a creation of a judiciary possessing limited
knowledge of the scope of problems created by tribal sovereign immunity.
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity as Inherent
In his dissent in Manufacturing Technologies, Justice Stevens' analysis of the lack
of legislative support for tribal immunity conflicts with long held doctrines of
deference towards Indian tribes and issues of tribal sovereignty. Tribal sovereign
immunity is a remnant of inherent tribal sovereignty, and thus comes completely
under the purview of the federal government acting as trustee." Absent express
federal legislation, Indian tribes retain rights inherent to their existence, and a state
seeking to limit or abrogate those rights would be acting either in an area contrary
S. 1691, 105th Cong. (1998). In June 1998, Senate Bill 1691 was withdrawn and divided
into five smaller bills. The applicable bill pertaining to enforcement of contracts with
Indian tribes reads as follows:
Section 1362 of title 28, United States Code, is amended-
(b)(1) The district courts shall have jurisdiction of any civil action or claim against an
Indian tribe ... for liquidated or unliquidated damages for cases not sounding in tort that
involve any contract made by the governing body of the Indian tribe or on behalf of an
Indian tribe.
(2) To the extent necessary to enforce this subsection, the tribal immunity of the Indian
tribe involved is waived.
S. 2299, 105th Cong. (1998). This bill was initially planned to be reintroduced in the 106th Congress,
but has not yet been so reintroduced. Telephone Interview with spokesperson for Sen. Slade Gorton (R.-
Wash.) (Oct. 25, 1999).
Currently, the 106th Congress is considering two bills broadly impacting tribal sovereignty. Senate
Bill 615, 106th Cong. (1999) was introduced in March 1999. The bill, "[tlo encourage Indian economic
development, to provide for a framework to encourage and facilitate intergovernmental tax agree-
ments ...." provides United States consent for tribes and states to enter into compacts to ensure the
collection of state tax revenue for commercial activities involving non-Indian persons occurring on Indian
land. S. 615, 106th Cong. § 4. The language of the act specifically prohibits the use of tribal sovereign
immunity as a defense for tribes in federal court. See S. 615, § 5(c)(2).
In addition, S. 613, 106th Cong. (1999) has passed the Senate and is now in committee before the
House. The bill, "to encourage Indian economic development, to provide for the disclosure of Indian
tribal sovereign immunity in contracts involving Indian tribes," primarily requires Indian tribes to
disclose, in all contracts that are subject to Secretary approval, the right of the tribe to assert tribal
sovereign immunity as a defense in an action brought against the tribe, or alternatively, expressly waive
tribal sovereign immunity as a defense. S. 613, § 2(c)(1)(B).
97. Telephone Interview with spokesperson for Sen. Slade Gorton (R.-Wash.) (Oct. 25, 1999).
98. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56, 58-59 (1978).
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to Congress' plenary power or in an area that would be preempted by federal law.
The Court in Manufacturing Technologies did not need legislative support to uphold
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity if it would have simply recognized that
the doctrine was a product of inherent sovereignty. The Court is silent as to whether
tribal immunity i:3 an inherent sovereign right, thus leaving limited judicial
foundation for the future of tribal sovereign immunity.
The dissent in Manufacturing Technologies argued that Hall controlled the issues
at bar - noting that states can exercise jurisdiction over Indian tribes as a matter
of comity." Howver, as the majority in Manufacturing Technologies clearly
stated, the state's right to allow other states to assert immunity in the former state's
courts for activities that occur within its jurisdiction as strictly a matter of comity
extends only to those parties committed to the doctrine of mutuality of conces-
sion.'" That doctrine was outlined in the Constitution - which was signed only
by the states - and as such, the Indian tribes are not party to such a doctrine."'
It seems that the Hall doctrine is weak to this extent. Oddly, in the Hoover II
decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reexamined the tribal immunity question and
made no mention of Hall, which was the crux of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
immunity argument in Hoover L It seems as though the Oklahoma Supreme
Court abandoned the Hoover I holding because of the weak value of the misplaced
Hall doctrine, relying instead on arguments of Oklahoma's unique relationship with
Indian tribes and the Montana decision. The Hall argument was a poor precedent
upon which the court relied in Hoover I, and provided an easy rebuttal for the
United States Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Montana argument against tribal
immunity used in Hoover 11 was not part of the Hoover I decision. For now, the
Montana decision remains untested by the Supreme Court as it relates to tribal
sovereign immunity. Just recently, Hoover II was reversed and remanded by the
United States Supreme Court, relying solely on Manufacturing Technologies.'"
C. Expanding the Doctrine?
The dissent in Manufacturing Technol6gies conceded that the Supreme Court
consistently has held that tribal sovereign immunity has been extended for activities
that are intratribal and "affecting matters of tribal self-government and
sovereignty."'" The United States Supreme Court has decided separate cases that
affect off-reservation activity'" and commercial activity.'" However, none of the
99. See Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
100. See id. at 756.
101. See id.
102. See Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe, 957 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1998).
103. See Kiowa Tribe v. Hoover, 119 S. Ct. 32 (1998) (vacating and remanding judgment in light
of Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc.).
104. Manufacturing Techs., 523 U.S. at 763.
105. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977) (sustaining tribal
immunity for fishing rights both on and off of the reservation).




Supreme Court decisions prior to Manufacturing Technologies provide any direction
for activities that are both off-reservation and purely commercial. If tribal sovereign
immunity was limited in the past to tribal activities that were either on-reservation
or were governmental in scope, it would now be obvious that after Manufacturing
Technologies the doctrine extends to all tribal activities, on or off reservation,
commercial or noncommercial. Indeed, Justice Stevens alluded to the ambiguity in
the immunity doctrine in his concurring opinion in Potawatomi.n At best,
Manufacturing Technologies is a judicial extension of a doctrine that already has a
questionable foundation. Unfortunately, the predictive value of the doctrine previous
to Manufacturing Technologies was not strong and the interpretation for lower
courts was varied. With the support of Manufacturing Technologies, the tribal
immunity doctrine is broader and well grounded by the Supreme Court. There is
little doubt that absent congressional action, this broader, clearer doctrine will be
applied by the lower courts.
D, Preemption
What becomes of the preemptive analysis used by states to tax and regulate
Indian tribes for activity that takes place outside of Indian country? The Supreme
Court has ruled in two different cases that Indians are subject to nondiscriminatory
state law when traveling outside of a reservation."m
However, the Supreme Court clearly stated in Potawatomi" and Manufacturing
Technologies"' that the right to demand compliance with state laws and the right
to enforce them judicially are separate issues. Although a state might demand that
all cigarette sales be taxed, a state would have no means available to collect those
taxes from tribal governments, absent seizure of unstamped cigarettes, negotiation,
or actions against wholesalers."'
The outcome of Manufacturing Technologies combined with Potawatomi is
troublesome. States have the power to subject Indian tribes to nondiscriminatory
state laws when outside of the reservation, but the state has no remedy against the
Indian tribes because of immunity. Feasibly, Indian tribes could gain increasing
economic power outside of the reservation where they would be subject to
nondiscriminatory state taxation. Nevertheless, the state could lose substantial
revenues and subsequently lose the power to act as a sovereign over its citizens.
(1991) (extending sovereign immunity for tribes to cigarette sales); United States v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940) (recognizing sovereign immunity for tribes for a lease on a coal-
mine operation).
107. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizens Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 515 (1991)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
108. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973); Organized Village of Kake
v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).
109. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514.
110. Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757-58 (1998).
111. See Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514. The other deceptively obvious choice would be to enforce
actions in tribal court. However, tribal courts are bound by tribal laws that can limit their subject matter
jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes 154-55.
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The power to tax is the power to destroy."' It also seems clear that when
balancing the power of the state to tax with the combination of the preemptive
shield tribes use to guard against discriminatory state tax and inherent sovereignty
as it could apply to tribal immunity, the Indian tribes would win most cases,
including those involving activities taking place off reservation.
E. Tribal v. State and Federal Immunity
The dissent in Manufacturing Technologies criticizes the rule presented by the
majority in Manufacturing Technologies as "anomalous."" Tribal immunity is
broader than state or federal sovereign immunity, primarily because most states have
explicitly waived immunity from suits for certain types of claims."' In addition,
the United States has waived its immunity for certain tort actions arising out of
commercial agplications. Congress and the United States Supreme Court have also
addressed immunity as to commercial activities of foreign sovereigns."' Both the
Tate Letter"' and later the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act denied immunity for
the commercial acts of a foreign nation."7 And clearly, after Hall, a state may be
sued in the courts of another state."' Virtually all other sovereign governments are
now limited in immunity from suits. Yet, it is curious that Indian tribes, as domestic
dependent nations,"' continue to exercise full immunity from suit. One commen-
tator noted that Indian tribes are unique because, unlike most federal, state, and
local governments, Indian tribes frequently enter into commercial activities normally
left to the private sector."z Tribal governments, handicapped with an additional
burden of acting as an economic conduit between the United States and the
individual members of the tribe, are forced to act differently than any other
identifiable sovereigns. This dependent domestic nation idea is perhaps the backdrop
112. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819).
113. Manufacturing Techs., 523 U.S. at 765.
114. See William Vetter, Doing Business with Indians and the Three "S"es: Secretarial Approval,
Sovereign Immunity, awl Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 169, 173 (1994).
115. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-89 (1983); see also 28
U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605, 1607 (1998).
116. See Letter from Jack Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State to Acting Attorney
General Phillip Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'r OF STATE BULL. 984-85 (1952). The Tate
Letter served as notice to the Attorney General's office that the State Department would begin notifying
the Attorney General's office of all requests for immunity by foreign governments. The State Department
believed that "the granting of sovereign immunity to foreign governments in the courts of the United
States is most inconsistent with the action of the Government... subjecting itself to suit in these same
courts in both contract and tort .... " Id. In addition, the State Department noted that the "widespread
and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary
a practice which will erable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the
courts." Id.
117. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 480.
118. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426.27 (1979).
119. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
120. See Mark Jartoe, Fundamental Legal Principles Affecting Business Transactions in Indian




for the unique issues facing Indian tribes, including the use of sovereign immunity
to protect tribal economic growth.
In addition, the idea of inherent sovereignty introduced in the line of cases
following Ex parte Crow Dog' and Talton v. Mayes'" as predating the
Constitution provides some insight into why tribal immunity still exists for Indian
tribes and why Congress now retains the power of controlling that sovereign
immunity. Uniquely, while states and the federal government control the future of
immunity as to their own sovereigns, Congress still has the power to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity completely." Perhaps in light of this risk, Indian tribes
should be allowed an opportunity to exercise an "anomalous" right to be immune
from suit.
Tribal sovereign immunity as a doctrine may well be "anomalous" and still be
justified as a tool of economic development. While states and the federal
government have found it prudent to limit the use of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity for economic, political, and legal reasons, Indian tribes have not yielded
this tool for the same reasons. It is quite foreseeable that eventually Indian tribes
will move beyond a broad application of sovereign immunity to a general waiver
of immunity for different claims. These actions by Indian tribes will likely be in
response to economic and political changes that take place within the relationships
Indian tribes develop with those outside of the Indian community. Indian tribes that
are in different stages of socioeconomic development could address immunity as to
the particular needs of each individual tribe, unless Congress addresses tribal
sovereign immunity first.
F. Tribal Sovereign Immunity - Justifications?
In Manufacturing Technologies, Justice Stevens suggests that there are no
legitimate grounds for such gracious amenities for Indian tribes in the United
States. 24 However, as the majority and many commentators have stated, tribal
sovereign immunity is retained for economic and tribal self-governance con-
siderations." The purpose of sovereign immunity in modern times is a function
of public policy.'" The Clinton Administration recently stated that limiting tribal
sovereign immunity would curtail economic development of federally recognized
Indian tribes."2 In addition, many legislators fear that exposing Indian tribes to
suit would threaten tribal economic development.'" Perhaps it should be noted that
121. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
122. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
123. See supra note 75.
124. See Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 1708 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
125. See Manufacturing Techs., 523 U.S. at 1704; see also infra text accompanying notes 126-40.
126. See Kenton Pettit, The Waiver of Tribal Sovereign Immunity in the Contractual Context:
Conflict Between the Ninth Circuit and the Alaska Supreme Court?, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 363,394(1993).
127. See Richard Carelli, Court Back Indians Over Lawsuits, Associated Press, May 26, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 6671284.
128. See Chris Casteel, Senator Withdraws Bill to Limit Indian Tribes' Immunity, DAILY
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Congress' ability to limit tribal sovereign immunity in amendments that were made
to sections 16 and 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act in fact ratified by
implication that tribal sovereign immunity is still important for Indian economic
development.'"
Perhaps the biggest part of economic development for Indian tribes is the natural
resources that many Indian tribes retain, particularly land and mineral rights.
"Sovereign immunity is intended to protect what assets the Indians still possess from
loss through litigation.""' The doctrine protects a limited number of resources
from rapid depletion. 3' For many tribes, natural resources remain the source of
future economic potential.' If a tribe's natural resources become depleted because
of lawsuits by non-tribal entities, tribes would be left without any economic
foundation.
One commentator believes that unsophisticated Indian tribes require protection
under the immunity doctrine primarily because they lack the financial and
governmental rescurces to make long-range economic decisions.' Oklahoma
tribal governments in particular have limited resources to fund all the services that
tribal members require.' Tribal governments do not have the advantage of a large
tax base to replace the assets from natural resources. 3S Tribal immunity provides
tribes a shield from non-Indian seizure of a limited supply of those assets.'36
Whether tribal resources are in the form of natural resources or tribal coffers,
certainly the resources do not compare to those proffered by state or federal
governments that benefit from large populations and economic stability.
Tribal sovereign immunity could be seen as a remnant of the Indian self-
determination era ushered into our society thirty years ago. The modem application
of sovereign immunity is to promote "tribal self-sufficiency and economic
development."'" One commentator suggests that tribal sovereign immunity is the
OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), May 21, 1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL 8866772.
129. See Pettit, supra note 126, at 394.
130. See id
131. See id.
132. The fruit of the negotiations between Indian tribes and the United States government over the
last 200 years has remained land. Although many times the land that was retained by tribes was not in
fee simple, the land wa3 nonetheless held in trust for the benefit of Indian tribes. Land was typically
recognized as the ultimate bargaining chip with Indian tribes, primarily because of traditional uses of land
by Indian tribes. See generally COHEN, supra note 51. Today, those traditional uses have been
transplanted with more economically rewarding uses, including mineral extraction. See id. at 312-13.
133. See id.
134. Brief for the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma and the Muscogee Nation as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 2, Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (No. 96-
1037).
135. See Pettit, supra note 126, at 394.
136. See id.
137. William Murphy, Jurisdiction - Sovereign Immunity - Business Owned by Native American
.Nation Granted Sovereign Immunity from Suit Arising from Its Private Off-Reservation Transaction, In
re Greene, 980 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994), 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L





"last stronghold of the promise of self-determination that has not been removed or
effectively gutted."'' If, in fact, tribal sovereign immunity has been maintained as
an element of self-determination, then Indian tribes should use sovereign immunity
as a negotiating tool in economic development to sustain tribal government and to
reduce dependency on federal funding."39 The Eighth Circuit noted that "[a]s rich
as the Choctaw Nation is said to be in lands and in money, it would soon be
impoverished if it was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts, and required to
respond to all the demands which private parties chose to prefer against it."'"
However, tribal sovereign immunity has been seen as debilitating for both Indian
tribes and states. Several legal and economic factors lead to the conclusion that
tribal immunity can restrict economic development for Indian tribes.' Transaction
costs of businesses and Indian tribes restrict the ability of parties to bargain out of
or waive sovereign immunity. 42 Potentially, every transaction would require
negotiation to waive or limit sovereign immunity of the Indian tribes. The additional
time, legal cost, or administrative cost would make transactions with relatively low
profit margins unaffordable. Now that tribal sovereign immunity extends to off-
reservation activities of Indian tribes, all transactions made off reservation land
without an express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity from the Indian tribe will
be unenforceable in state and federal courts, forcing businesses to question the risk
involved in entering the transaction.
Some commentators note that reliance on tribal immunity results in resentment
and missed opportunities for tribal economic development.43 Media accounts of
tribal injustice reflect the notion that tribal immunity hurts Indian tribes.'" Sen.
Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R.-Colo.), the only Indian in the Senate, has charac-
terized tribal immunity as an obstacle for states and persons with civil actions
against Indian tribes.' Attorneys have advised businesses to treat Indian tribal
accounts differently than other accounts, citing the inability to enforce judgments
against the Indian tribes for nonpayment." One tribe noted in recent testimony
to the Senate that sovereign immunity should never be used for "economic mis-
judgments," and that Indian tribes must continue to allow limited waivers of
immunity to facilitate economic development.47 The economic development of
138. Vicki J. Limas, Sovereignty as a Bar to Enforcement of Executive Order No. 11,246 in Federal
Contracts with Native American Tribes, 26 N.M. L. REy. 257, 277 (1996).
139. See id.
140. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1895).
141. See Donnelly, supra note 10.
142. See Raymond Cross, De-Federalizing American Indian Commerce: Toward a New Political
Economy for Indian Country, 16 HARv. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 445, 475 (1993) (citing PRESIDENTIAL
COMMN ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES, PART 1 (1984)).
143. See Donnelly, supra note 10.
144. See id.
145. See Casteel, supra note 128, at 3.
146. See Martin Paskind, Indian Tribes and Sovereign Immunity, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 6, 1998,
at 3, available in 1998 WL 13829953.
147. See Economic Development: Heating on S. 1691 Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, 105th
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Indian tribes now relies so much on off-reservation transactions for land, supplies,
banking, etc., that tribal governments will continue to struggle to find businesses
that will enter into transactions without waivers of immunity.
Congress has attempted to address concerns about tribal sovereign immunity. The
legislative history of the Indian Reorganization Act reveals that two types of tribal
entities were created so that tribal interests could be protected as section 16
corporations, while section 17 corporations would be open to limited liability. 4 '
Section 16 organizations recognize the political organization of a tribe and are used
to facilitate tribal government.'49 Section 17 organizations allow tribes to operate
as a corporation authorized by the United States Government.'-' Many section 17
entities contain "sue or be sued" clauses. Courts are generally split on whether "sue
or be sued" clauses constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity."' This arrangement
was done partly to facilitate businesses that would otherwise be reluctant to extend
credit to tribal entities that could assert a defense of sovereign immunity."'
However, this assumes that businesses are aware of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and its specific application to the Indian tribe with which they are dealing.
One commentator stated that because the doctrine of tribal sovereignty is so
engrained in our legal system, "if a non-Indian business knowingly enters into a
contract without a waiver, the court should determine that the business has deemed
the particular venture worth the risk."'5
The only option available for businesses seeking remedies are tribal courts. Many
non-Indian businesses are reluctant to become involved in the tribal court
system."s' Tribal courts, unless acting as federal courts under delegated power, do
not provide the Constitutional protections found in state and federal courts. 5
Congress must con;ider that if businesses must bring redress in tribal courts, then
those tribal courts must provide these basic constitutional judicial protections to plaintiffs.'"
Cong. (1998), available in 1998 WL 12760517 (statement of Russell D. Mason, Sr. Chairman, Three
Affiliated Tribes).
148. See Pettit, supra note 126, at 378-79.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See CANBY, s'pra note 12, at 94.
152. See Pettit, supra note 126, at 378-79.
153. Recent Case, 10 HARV. L. REv. 533, 561-62 n.43 (1988).
154. See Vetter, supra note 114, at 192.
155. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, provides substantial guarantees
similar to those provided under the Bill of Rights. However, several key provisions are missing,
including a bar from establishment of religion and the right to free counsel. The United States Supreme
Court limited the force of the Indian Civil Rights Act in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,
61 (1978), holding that the sole remedy for redress under the Indian Civil Rights Act was a writ of
habeas corpus.
156. The Indian Civil Rights Act was enacted to address many of these concerns relating to tribal
government action. However, the extent to which courts interpret the rights extended through the ICRA
as being identical to those of the United States Constitution is questionable. For example the Ninth
Circuit has stated that "due process concepts are not readily separated from [the tribe's] attendant cultural
baggage." Randall v. Yckima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1988). This example




State courts have, at times, looked at the fallacies of tribal immunity. In Dixon
v. Picopa Construction Co., the Arizona Supreme Court stated that limiting
sovereign immunity in off-reservation activities would further tribal economic
development.'" One commentator suggests that limiting tribal sovereign immunity
will protect contract rights and build long term economic relationships between
tribal governments and non-Indian businesses. Limitations on tribal immunity will
also increase economic development in Indian government, further tribal self-
determination, and strengthen tribal courts."s
Economic relationships are built on equity and fairness, and if one party is bound
while another is not, those at higher risk will limit their interaction with the low-risk
party. If the playing field is leveled, then businesses can come to the table with
Indian tribes understanding that both are at the same risk in the transaction; both
seek to gain or to lose. Under these conditions, the value of the transaction will
most likely reflect the risks to both parties. This balanced risk will force Indian
tribes to make conservative, well-planned economic decisions, thus furthering the
goal of self-determination. Strong economic development and balanced risk, along
with federally legislated judicial protections, will provide parties on both sides an
opportunity to use tribal courts as an alternative forum to which the parties come
with even interests, and thus build respect for tribal court verdicts.
G. Tribal Sovereign Immunity - An Injustice
One commentator described Native American tribes as "mini-Soviet Unions"
which provide no legal remedy for wrongs committed." 9 This bold statement is
quite similar to the views held by Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens in his dissent in
Manufacturing Technologies starkly stated that the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity is unjust and that "governments, like individuals, should pay their debts
and should be held accountable for their unlawful, injurious conduct.""lw Unfor-
tunately, a business relationship without a remedy is usually a relationship entered
into with high risk and little choice. Sovereign immunity "is enjoyed at the pleasure
of the holder," and to the detriment of those dealing with the holder.' An official
of the Arizona Gaming Department recently stated that customers of Indian casinos
should be aware that their rights are "left at the boundary when they enter the
reservation."'" The reality of that statement might not be very far from the truth.
Those dealing with Indian tribes off the reservation are without remedy, whether or
not knowledge of the tribe's immunity exists. Certainly, our country should afford
those unjustly injured a place in a court of equity, if no cause of action existed at
law. Unfortunately, the laws of equity do not play out when Indian tribes are
with traditional tribal cultures forced to recognize constitutional principles.
157. See Cross, supra note 142, at 476-77 (citing Dixon v. Picopa Const. Co., 772 P.2d 1104 (Ariz.
1989)).
158. See Cross, supra note 142, at 452.
159. See Donnelly, supra note 10.
160. Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,766 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Pettit, supra note 126, at 393.
162. Donnelly, supra note 10.
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involved. Indian tribes are free to breach every contract, or cause every tortuous
injury, no matter how far they are from the reservation, and never answer for their
actions in state or federal court.
However, the National American Indian Court Judges Association recently stated
at a Senate hearing on tribal sovereign immunity that complaints on tribal immunity
are "based largely on anecdotal complaints from disgruntled individuals who did not
get their way in a. particular tribal forum, or merely dislike a proposed tribal
project."'" Proponents of tribal sovereign immunity continue by saying that
limiting tribal immunity punishes Indian tribes for the federal government's failure
in its role as guardian to provide appropriate resources to develop tribal
governments and court systems."
However, it is naive for courts and Indian tribes to assume that all who enter into
business transactions enter as sophisticated business persons with "eyes open."
Although each party is responsible for the terms of the contract, it is hardly just for
one to be responsible for something of which he has no notice. The doctrine of
constructive notice would seem to be insufficient to bind a business which operates
in reliance on a tribe's representations.
Lack of contractual remedies, loss of personal rights, and restriction of economic
development are all consequences of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The
effects of dealing with Indian tribes and the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
can be dramatic. To enter into relationships with Indian tribes requires an
appreciation and re;pect for the current state of sovereign immunity.
Indian tribes lack large land bases and access to tribal banks, and have limited
on-reservation resources to facilitate running a government. In addition, most Indian
tribes also are without adequate infrastructure to develop utilities, transportation and
other public services."6 As a result, most tribal transactions occur off-reser-
vation.16
The policies behind tribal immunity must be considered as a whole because of
this reality. As Indian tribes are forced off the reservation to trade, businesses must
consider the policy and legal implications behind dealing with Indian tribes in order
to make appropriate economic and social decisions in considering the transaction.
163. Economic Development: Hearing on S. 1691 Before Committee on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong.
(1998), available in 1998 WL 12760429 (statement of Donald R. Wharton, Attorney with Native
American Rights Fund rtnd Jill E. Shibles, President of the National American Indian Court Judges
Association).
164. See id.
165. Brief for the lavajo Nation, the Navajo Nation Oil and Gas Co., the Navajo Agricultural
Products Industry, and thc Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,






V. Current Climate in Oklahoma
Ironically, in Oklahoma, especially after Hoover I in 1995, the legal climate was
such that businesses knew Oklahoma would enforce contracts made off-reservation
by Indian tribes. Prior to Manufacturing Technologies, businesses in Oklahoma
relied on knowing that there would be an appropriate remedy for any actions against
an Indian tribe if the activities in which the business engaged were off-reservation.
Today, businesses in Oklahoma no longer enjoy the ability to bring Indian tribes
into state court for common law suits against tribes." In addition, federal courts
are also unavailable for suits against Indian tribes unless jurisdiction is expressly
provided by federal law." Businesses in Oklahoma must rewrite their policies
dealing with tribal governments so as to avoid legal relationships that afford no
remedy for non-Indian parties.
It is critical that the legal status of any Indian-related entity be determined before
entering into a commercial relationship." Businesses must know the nature of the
entity with which they are contracting prior to engaging in a legal relationship.
Sovereign immunity extends only to tribal governments and their sub-entities.
Immunity does not extend to members of the Indian tribes or to government
officials acting outside of the scope of their duties within the tribal organization.7 '
Similarly, it is important to recognize whether the party with which one is doing
business is acting under the tribal government. Some tribal organizations operating
off-reservation might represent that they are not acting as the tribe, but several
factors are critical in determining whether in fact they are acting as the tribe.
Factors that courts have considered include: whether the organization is organized
as a subordinate economic organization to the tribe without a separate board of
directors;' whether the organization has purchased general liability insurance or
created a limited liability clause in the corporate charter to limit tribal assets;"n
whether the organization was formed to carry out tribal government functions;"
whether the organization is wholly owned by the tribal government;74 whether the
organization is created under the tribal constitution or bylaws; 75 whether the
organization holds itself out as a business entity separate and distinct from the
tribe;'76 whether the organization's management functions are or could be deter-
167. See supra text accompanying note 2.
168. See supra text accompanying note 2.
169. See Vetter, supra note 114, at 193.
170. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
171. See Dixon v. Picopa Const. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1109 (Ariz. 1989); see also S. Unique, Ltd.
v. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Comm'n, 674 P.2d 1376, 1379 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
172. See Dixon, 772 P.2d at 1109-110.
173. See id. at 1110.
174. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Industrial Comm'n, 696 P.2d 223, 230 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985)
175. See S. Unique, 674 P.2d at 1379.
176. See White Mountain Apache Indian Tribe v. Shelley, 480 P.2d 654, 656 (1971).
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mined by the tribe;"n whether the organization's purchases are in accordance with
tribal purchasing policies; whether the tribe has the power to dismiss employees
of the organization;" and whether or not the organization is exercising
governmental powr.'" Although this list is not exhaustive, it is extremely
important that businesses evaluate these factors prior to entering into what
potentially could be an unenforceable contract.
Organizations, upon identifying the type of entity with which they are dealing,
should note the options available to avoid a lack of remedy for activities performed
outside of Indian country. Businesses and their counsel must remember that Indian
tribes regard tribal sovereign immunity as just another variable in negotiating
business transactions.' Counsel must also note that tribal assets are for the
benefit of all tribal members. Most Indian tribes are reluctant to waive sovereign
immunity and expose those assets to suit." This is because Indian tribes rarely
have a large tax base or large enough property holdings to run tribal government
services without federal support.'"
The most significant tactic in reducing risk in transactions with Indian tribes is
to secure a waiver of tribal immunity. '" Case law has progressively moved from
177. See Shelley, 4.0 P.2d at 656.
178. See id.
179. See i.
180. See Southwest Forest Indus. v. Hupa Timber Corp., 198 Cal. Rptr. 690, 696 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984); see also Vetter, spra note 114, at 177.
181. See Pettit, supta note 126, at 396.
182. See John F. Petoskey, Doing Business with Michigan Indian Tribes, 76 MiCH. B.J. 440, 444
(1997).
183. See id.
184. Specific examples of waivers include:
Example A
The Tribe for itself and for the Enterprise waives its sovereign immunity and that of
the Enterprise in favor of the Manager and its successor in interest to the full extent
necessary for the performance of this Contract, the Loan Documents and any Collateral
Agreements required to be approved in connection with the Enterprise. This waiver is a
limited waiver of sovereign immunity as to such matters only, and does not extend
beyond such matters, and therefore is limited to revenues, cash or other income derived
from the Enterprbse. The Tribe for itself and for the Enterprise hereby agrees not to take
any action which would result in the revocation or modification of the limited waiver
contemplated by this Section.
Example B
A-By this Agreement, the Tribe does not waive, limit ormodify its sovereign immunity
from unconsented suit except as specifically provided in this Section.
B-The Tribe does grant a limited waiver of its sovereign immunity as to any claim if,
and only if, each and every one of the following four conditions is met:
A. The claim is made by the Contractor, or a party to which the Contractor has
assigned or sold i's interest under this Agreement;
B. The claim eileges a breach by the Tribe of one or more of the specific obligation
or duties expressly assumed by it under the terms of this Agreement;
C. The claim is first presented in writing to the Tribal Council, which will have 15
days to act on such claim before the waiver becomes effective; and




requiring congressional consent to waive tribal immunity to the tribe's freedom to
expressly waive tribal sovereign immunity."u Although tribal governments have
generally been known to have the right to waive sovereign immunity, the United
States Supreme Court has held that waivers of sovereign immunity must be
unequivocally expressed." Waiver of tribal immunity must be a tribal or
congressional statement that explicitly consents to suit."'
Tribes in Oklahoma are specifically exempted from the Indian Reorganization Act
as passed in 1934." In 1936, Congress passed a similar bill specifically for
Oklahoma titled the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, which essentially provided that
tribes would enjoy any "rights or privileges secured to an organized Indian tribe"
under the Indian Reorganization Act, including the specific sections detailing section
16 and 17 entities." If a tribe expressly waives immunity as a section 16 entity,
it is particularly important that the assets available for remedy are identified.
However, courts have noted that Indian tribes that organize under both IRA sections
16 and 17, and which lack an adequate firewall between the tribal government and
the tribal corporation can have assets assigned to the section 17 entity vulnerable
to the assets set up within the section 16 entity." Parties dealing with tribal
entities must be sure to determine what entities have control over any assets to
which access in the event of a default would be adequate .9 "It is clear that the
waiver of sovereign immunity by the section 17 corporation does not waive
A. Some specific action, or discontinuance of some action, by the Tribe, to bring the
Tribe into full compliance with the duties and obligations expressly assumed by the Tribe
in this Agreement; or
B. Money damages for such non-compliance only, which will be payable only from
the Tribe's revenues derived from the operation of the casino and not from any other
source or other asset or property of the Tribe.
C-Under this limited waiver of sovereign immunity, any suit or proceeding brought
hereunder may be brought in any federal or state court of competent jurisdiction and both
parties irrevocably submit to the jurisdiction of such court and agree to give full legal
effect to any order or judgment resulting therefrom; provided, however, that no suit or
proceeding may be brought hereunder in any state court unless and until a federal court
shall have determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit or proceeding.
D-The parties hereby agree that under the limited waiver of sovereign immunity
provided for herein, the assumption of jurisdiction by any federal or state court of
competent jurisdiction shall not be delayed or curtailed by any doctrine requiring
exhaustion of tribal court remedies, there being no tribal court remedies available to the
Contractor.
Heidi L. McNeil, Doing Bgsiness in Indian Country. 872 PLIICORP 7, 20-21 (1994).
185. See Vetter, supra note 114, at 193.
186. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
187. See Vetter, supra note 114, at 174.
188. See COHEN, supra note 51, at 455.
189. "[Indian tribes enjoy any] rights or privileges secured to an organized Indian tribe under
sections 461, 463, 464, 466 to 477, 471 to 473, 474, 475, 476-478, and 479 of this title." 25 U.S.C. §
503 (1994).
190. See Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 F.2d 151, 174-75 (Alaska 1977).
191. Mark Jarboe, The Gaming Industry on American Indian Lands: Financing and Development
Issues, 872 PLI/CoRP 161, 178 (1994).
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immunity of the section 16 tribal government."'" Businesses negotiating with
tribes should also be aware of assets that could be held as inaccessible during a
lawsuit because cf unclear distinctions between section 16 and section 17
entities."'
There has been some question as to whether "sue or be sued""' clauses act as
waivers of tribal immunity. Generally, courts have held that absent clear delineation
between tribal entities, these clauses do not meet the express standard outlined in
Santa Clara.'95 Waivers of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed
and cannot be implied." In addition, tribal organizations incorporated under state
law have also been held to be immune from suit despite "sue or be sued" clauses
in the state law.'
Tribes are limitel in their ability to waive tribal immunity in matters affecting
Indian land held in trust by the United States Government. Any waivers affecting
trust land are required to have approval of the Secretary of Interior.'
Several other alternatives exist to protect businesses. Aside from negotiating a
waiver of immunity from a tribe, businesses can use terminable contracts based on
monthly performance for small transactions or performance that takes place
simultaneously. Businesses can require that tribes perform contract provisions
first." By requiring tribes to perform first, the non-tribal business can reduce the
risk created by not negotiating a waiver of sovereign immunity.' The parties can
also escrow the tribe's performance. By having a third party hold assets required
for performance, tie tribe is protected without requiring it to waive sovereign
immunity, and the non-tribal business is allowed to continue performance with an
assurance that the tribe cannot default.' Businesses can also require a waiver of
immunity for a particular transaction. In limited waivers, Indian tribes can limit
exposure of certain assets from suit.'n As stated earlier, general waivers are
impracticable for Indian tribes and most waivers will pertain strictly to the legal
relationship created, Waivers must be express and clear to bind the tribe.
In addition to a waiver, businesses can negotiate with tribes to have tribal courts
or administrative agencies adjudicate or enforce any issues arising under the
agreement between the tribe and the business. This affords the tribe an opportunity
192. Mark K. Ulmer, The Legal Origin and Nature of Indian Housing Authorities and the HUD
Indian Housing Programs, 13 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109, 138 (1988).
193. See Pettit, supia note 126, at 397.
194. "Sue or be sued" clauses are typically used to negotiate the right of a party both to hold himself
out for suit, or to sue the contracting party in a particular forum.
195. Santa Clara Purblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
196. See id.
197. See Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Community Fund, Inc., 658 N.E.2d 989, 994-995
(N.Y. 1995).
198. See 25 U.S.C. 1 81 (1997).
199. See Jarboe, supra note 191, at 178.
200. See id.
201. See hi. at 198.
202. See id.




to "play on its own turf' while allowing a business to negotiate the terms and
conditions that tribal courts, administrative agencies, or tribal dispute resolution
services will employ to resolve any disputes in the agreement. One drawback
to this approach is that there is no assurance that other tribal entities will perform
the obligations of a contract nor is there any non-tribal remedy. The result puts a
business back into the position of having no remedy against Indian tribes that have
breached an agreement.
Several tribes are beginning to adopt their own tribal commercial codes that are
used to enforce and regulate transactions with both non-Indians and Indians.
However, businesses should be cautioned that the existence of a UCC-style code
does not afford a business any more of a remedy for a breach than existed prior to
the establishment of the tribal legislation.
Finally, an arbitration clause has been held not to be an express waiver of tribal
immunity.' However, the Eighth Circuit held that an arbitration clause that called
for decisions based on the American Arbitration Association was a clear waiver of
sovereign immunity.'
This list of possible approaches for organizations dealing with Indian tribes is
certainly not exhaustive. However, each negotiated transaction with an Indian tribe
should take into account the underlying premise of these approaches, that is, to limit
an organization's exposure to unnecessary and sometimes unexpected financial risk.
VI. Conclusion
It is obvious that the transaction costs of conducting business with Indian tribes
for activities that take place off-reservation will increase, but the risk of doing
business without a remedy can be more costly. There will be cases in which
businesses find that the transaction costs will not outweigh the benefit of perfor-
mance and resultant risk of nonperformance, but these instances seem to be
uncommon. Until Congress accepts the Supreme Court's invitation to limit or
abrogate tribal immunity, businesses in Oklahoma must continue to alter legal
relationships with Indian tribes that conduct activities outside of Indian country.
Tribal sovereign immunity is a doctrine that was judicially created to provide for
economically developing Indian tribes, but after Manufacturing Technologies, the
doctrine may be broadening to the extent of altering traditional transaction risk
analysis of businesses operating in Oklahoma.
David B. Jordan
204. See Mike McBride 111, Your Place or Mine? Commercial Transactions Between Indian Tribes
and Non-Indians in Oklahoma-New Rules for Tribal Sovereign Immunity, in SOVEREIGNTY SYMPOSIUM
X 104, 112 (1996).
205. See Vetter, supra note 114, at 183 (citing Pan Am. Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians,
884 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1989)).
206. See Arbitration Clause Ruled a Wavier of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 50 SEP Disp. RESOL.
J., July 1995, at 89.
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